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  1 
Article 158(3) of the Hong Kong Basic Law and the 
Preliminary Reference Procedure of the  
European Union 
Patrick Jiang* and Gonzalo Villalta Puig ** 
Abstract 
This Article analyses the preliminary reference procedure under Article 158(3) of the 
Hong Kong Basic Law and its transplantation from Article 267 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union. Preliminary reference procedures require courts of final 
appeal to refer certain questions of law to a higher legal authority for determination before they 
can give judgement. This Article argues that this area of Hong Kong constitutional law is 
underdeveloped, due in large part to the unwillingness of the Hong Kong judiciary to respect the 
interests of the national legislature. An examination of the preliminary reference procedure, as 
practiced in the E.U., makes clear that the constitutional order in Hong Kong must do more to 
balance regional and national interests. To that end, this Article recommends several reforms: 
1) to eliminate the existing jurisprudence regarding Article 158(3) of the Basic Law; 2) to 
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adopt E.U.-style doctrines of judicial economy, including irrelevant question, acte éclairé, and 
acte clair; 3) to adopt a doctrine of sincere cooperation, so as to increase the quality and 
quantity of judicial references; and 4) to modernize the concept of Hong Kong law to a hybrid 
system of common law and Chinese law.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The year 2015 marked the twenty-fifth anniversary of the promulgation of 
the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the Peoples 
Republic of China (Basic Law), while 2017 marked twenty years since the return 
of Hong Kong to the Peoples Republic of China (PRC or China). These are 
major milestones for a unique constitutional experiment in which the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region of the PRC (Hong Kong) and the rest of 
China (mainland China) co-exist as the same sovereign country but under 
completely different political, legal, and economic systems. The principle of this 
co-existenceOne Country, Two Systemsis fundamental to the Basic Law. 
Both mainland China and Hong Kong have gained experience while living 
under this unique constitutional system. Yet, many areas of constitutional law 
remain underdeveloped. This is partly due to the unprecedented nature of the 
Basic Law, meaning that Hong Kong has to build up a constitutional 
jurisprudence from scratch. It is also partly due to political sensitivities, which 
inhibit a vigorous and constructive judicial dialogue. 
This Article focuses on Article 158(3) of the Basic Law, which has proved 
to be one of its most controversial provisions. It defines a preliminary reference 
procedure, through which the National Peoples Congress Standing Committee 
(NPCSC)the legislator of the central government in Beijingis to be the 
ultimate interpreter of the Basic Law. Under Article 158(3), Hong Kong courts 
must refer questions of law to the NPCSC when judicial decisions require 
interpretations of certain Basic Law provisions and such judicial decisions 
cannot be appealed. This situation is openly opposed by many lawyers and 
judges in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal (CFA), the 
highest regional court in Hong Kong, has seldom dealt with Article 158(3), and, 
when it has, it has decided cases in confusing, even absurd, ways to avoid 
making references to the NPCSC. 
The jurisprudential development of Basic Law Article 158(3) remains 
primitive. The judicial and political elites do not agree on when a preliminary 
reference must be made. The people of Hong Kong have a poor understanding 
about the procedures role in the constitutional order. Politics and law are often 
conflated, and when that happens, legal clarity is rarely the victor. 
This Article argues that it is time to recall the European Union (E.U.) 
origins of Article 158(3). Article 158(3) was explicitly modelled upon the 
preliminary reference procedure in Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (TFEU).1 The E.U., unlike Hong Kong, has developed a 
                                                 
1  SHUWEN WANG, INTRODUCTION TO THE BASIC LAW OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE REGION 21617 (2d ed. 2009). 
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workable and reputable jurisprudence to govern its preliminary references. 
Given the plain intention of the Basic Law to imitate the E.U.s constitution in 
this provision, it is worth considering whether Hong Kong can also imitate the 
E.U.s subsequent practice and jurisprudence. While existing literature tends to 
emphasize the Basic Laws difference from other constitutional systems, Basic 
Law Article 158(3) is an instance of similarity in which Hong Kong can learn 
much from a foreign jurisdiction. Indeed, Hong Kong will have to learn quickly 
if it wants to prove, before the expiry date of the Basic Law in 2047, that the 
latter is a workable constitutional document in all respects. 
Section II of this Article gives a brief summary of the origins of Article 
158(3) and the confusing jurisprudence surrounding it. Section III explains the 
essential similarities between Basic Law Article 158(3) and TFEU Article 267. 
Section IV then explains how three E.U. rules of judicial economy (irrelevant 
question, acte éclairé, and acte clair) can be imitated by Hong Kong. Section V 
explains that Article 158(3), being copied from an E.U. treaty, necessarily brings 
with it the E.U. doctrine of sincere cooperation. Sincere cooperation is currently 
lacking in Hong Kong, but it is needed to realize the true design of the Basic 
Law. Finally, Section VI recommends important steps that the CFA must take to 
realize the intent of Article 158(3). 
II. ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF ARTICLE 158(3) OF THE 
BASIC LAW 
The Basic Law was drafted by a committee made up of fifty-nine 
politicians, technocrats, and legal experts: thirty-six from mainland China and 
twenty-three from Hong Kong.2 Over the course of about four-and-a-half years, 
from July 1985 to February 1990, the committee produced two drafts, 
respectively opened to public comment in 1988 and 1989, and a final draft, 
which was adopted in 1990.3 The Basic Law Drafting Committee also had the 
assistance of the Basic Law Consultative Committee, consisting of 180 people 
from Hong Kong, and the Sino-British Joint Liaison Group, which facilitated 
communication between the Chinese and British governments during the 
handover of Hong Kong.4 
Collectively, the people contributing to the creation of the Basic Law had 
knowledge of diverse systems of law, including the English common law and 
                                                 
2  For brief history and timeline of the Basic Laws drafting, see THE HONG KONG BASIC LAW: 
BLUEPRINT FOR STABILITY AND PROSPERITY UNDER CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY? Appendix B (Ming 
K. Chan & David J. Clark eds., 1991). 
3  Id. 
4 Id.  
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Chinese civil law. It is reasonable to suppose that the final product benefited 
from many peoples experience in existing systems. However, only one provision 
in the Basic Law is copied explicitly from a foreign source. That provision is 
Basic Law Article 158(3), which defines the preliminary reference procedure for 
interpretation of the Basic Law: 
The courts of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may also 
interpret [provisions of this Law which are outside the limits of the 
autonomy of the Region] in adjudicating cases. However, if the courts of the 
Region, in adjudicating cases, need to interpret the provisions of this Law 
concerning affairs which are the responsibility of the Central Peoples 
Government, or concerning the relationship between the Central 
Authorities and the Region, and if such interpretation will affect the 
judgments on the cases, the courts of the Region shall, before making their 
final judgments which are not appealable, seek an interpretation of the 
relevant provisions from the Standing Committee of the National Peoples 
Congress through the Court of Final Appeal of the Region. When the 
Standing Committee makes an interpretation of the provisions concerned, 
the courts of the Region, in applying those provisions, shall follow the 
interpretation of the Standing Committee. However, judgments previously 
rendered shall not be affected.5 
To summarize, there are areas of the Basic Law that are wholly within the 
autonomous control of Hong Kong and areas that are not. For those that are 
not, the ultimate power of interpretation is not with the Hong Kong courts but 
with the NPCSC. Furthermore, if a Hong Kong court comes upon an issue 
outside of regional autonomy that affects the outcome of a case that is not 
appealable, the court must seek an authoritative interpretation from the NPCSC. 
Thus, Article 158(3) effectively changed the judicial hierarchy in Hong 
Kong to reflect the territorys transition from a colony to a highly autonomous 
region. Under colonial rule, legal questions could be appealed to the Judicial 
Committee of the U.K.s Privy Council.6 After the handover, Hong Kong was 
given an independent judiciary with the power of final adjudication and 
interpretation over large areas of legal competence. For other areas that were 
beyond the legal competence of Hong Kong, a national body had to have a right 
of participation, to make final interpretations on issues that concerned the 
central government. The solution of Article 158(3) was to adopt an E.U.-style 
preliminary reference procedure, to suit the new constitutional order.7 
                                                 
5  XIANGGANG JIBEN FA [THE BASIC LAW OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION 
OF THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA] art. 158(3) (H.K.) [hereinafter BASIC LAW]. 
6 See China Field Limited v. Appeal Tribunal (Buildings), [2009] 5 H.K.L.R.D. 662, at ¶¶ 79, 81 
(C.F.A.). 
7 See Zhenmin Wang, From the Judicial Committee of the British Privy Council to the Standing Committee of the 
Chinese National Peoples Congress: An Evaluation of the Legal Interpretive System after the Handover, 37 
H.K.L.J. 605, 614 (2007). 
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A. Case Law 
Article 158(3) was a creative solution to an unusual historical problem. On 
its surface, it strikes a balance between the interests of two layers of government: 
the Central Peoples Government of the PRC and the Hong Kong regional 
government. It assigns to each a respective place in judicial interpretation where 
the division of competence makes it appropriate. However, Article 158(3) has 
been controversial in practice. 
According to Chinese constitutional principles, the ultimate power to 
interpret the Constitution of the PRC and PRC statutes must rest with the 
highest organ of democratic power: the National Peoples Congress.8 This body 
is the national legislature and the most direct representative of the people of 
China at the national level.9 The National Peoples Congress is awkwardly large 
and meets for only two weeks a year, so it can only deal with high-level issues as 
a plenary body.10 It has a standing committee (NPCSC), a subgroup of about 160 
people, that deals with finer issues of legislation throughout the year.11 One 
major function of the NPCSC is to interpret legislation.12 In keeping with 
Chinese constitutional principles, the NPCSC is entitled to make and interpret 
the laws of the PRC at any time, for any reason.13 
In the legal order of the PRC, the Basic Law is ordinary legislation;14 as 
such it can be interpreted by the NPCSC like any other legislation. Article 158(3) 
provides one way to solicit an NPCSC interpretation of the Basic Law, but it is 
by no means the only way. Of the five NPCSC interpretations of the Basic Law 
to date, only one of them was requested through Article 158(3).15 A second was 
requested by the Hong Kong government via the State Council.16 Another was 
                                                 
8  See Dingjian Cai, Functions of the Peoples Congress in the Process of Implementation of Law, in 
IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW IN THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA 35, 36 (Jianfu Chen et al. eds., 
2002) ([S]ince [the NPC] is the supreme organ of state power, it does not allow the ultimate 
power of the interpretation of law to rest with the Supreme Peoples Court. Otherwise, there 
would exist a power restricting the power of legislation, which is inconsistent with the principle of 
democratic centralism.). 
9  See QIANFAN ZHANG, THE CONSTITUTION OF CHINA: A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS 124 (2012) 
(describing the National and Local Peoples Congresses, which are officially regarded as the 
cornerstone of the current Constitution and the primary symbol of Chinas democracy). 
10  Id. at 13132. 
11  Id. 
12  XIANFA [CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA] art. 67(4) (1982) (China). 
13  See ZHANG, supra note 9, at 13536. 
14  BASIC LAW, supra note 5, at Instrument 9 (documenting the adoption of the Basic Law by the 
National Peoples Congress). 
15  Id. at Instrument 22. 
16  Id. at Instrument 17. 
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requested by the State Council itself.17 And two others were requested by the 
NPCSCs Council of Chairmen.18 So far, nearly all NPCSC Basic Law 
interpretations have not been obtained through the Article 158(3) procedure. 
The concept of NPCSC interpretation is alien to common law lawyers. In 
common law systems, laws are supposed to be interpreted by courts in the 
course of litigation, and legislatures are not supposed to determine the outcome 
of judicial proceedings.19 The fact that the NPCSC can make interpretations that 
are not consistent with common law procedure, and not specifically allowed by 
Article 158(3), is said by some to undermine Hong Kongs autonomy and 
judicial independence.20 
The Court of Final Appeals (CFA) is likewise unenthusiastic about the 
interpretive powers of the NPCSC. Although the CFA recognizes the NPCSCs 
constitutional role,21 the CFA prefers not to incur an Article 158(3) obligation to 
refer. For its part, the CFA has articulated a confusing set of rules establishing 
when it will or will not refer questions to the NPCSC. The rules revolve around 
four tests: classification, predominant provision, necessity, and arguability. 
1. Classification 
The first test for judicial referral concerns classification. The CFA 
announced the test in the case of Ng Ka Ling v. Director of Immigration.22 In that 
case, several children who claimed to be born permanent residents of Hong 
Kong attempted to assert their right of abode in Hong Kong. All of them had 
entered or stayed in Hong Kong without proper documentation. At issue in the 
case was the interplay between two provisions of the Basic Law: Article 24 
(defining permanent residents)23 and Article 22(4) (requiring people from other 
parts of China to apply for approval before entering Hong Kong).24 Could a 
                                                 
17  Id. at Instrument 20. 
18  Id. at Instruments 18, 25. 
19  See Zhenmin Wang, supra note 7, at 61011; Andrew Li, The Development of the Common Law in Hong 
Kong under One Country Two Systems, 21 SING. ACAD. L.J. 375, 38081 (2009). 
20  See, for example, Yash Ghai, The Intersection of Chinese Law and the Common Law in the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region: Question of Technique or Politics?, 37 H.K.L.J. 363, 39091 (2007); Albert H.Y. 
Chen, The Rule of Law under One Country Two Systems: The Case of Hong Kong, 1997-2010, 6 NATL 
TAIWAN U. L. REV. 269, 275 (2011). 
21  The plenary power of the NPCSC to interpret the Basic Law is confirmed by the Hong Kong 
Court of Final Appeal in Lau Kong Yung v. Director of Immigration, [1999] 3 H.K.L.R.D. 778 
(C.F.A.). 
22  Ng Ka Ling v. Director of Immigration, [1999] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 315 (C.F.A.). 
23  BASIC LAW, supra note 5, at art. 24 (listing six categories of permanent residents). 
24  Id. at art. 2 (For entry into the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, people from other 
parts of China must apply for approval.). 
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permanent resident under Article 24 nevertheless be denied recognition by the 
Director of Immigration for not complying with Article 22(4)? Put another way, 
was Article 24 permanent resident status qualified by Article 22(4)s procedural 
requirements? 
The CFA considered whether it was necessary to ask the NPCSC for an 
interpretation. First, the CFA examined whether the provisions of the Basic 
Law in question (a) concern affairs which are the responsibility of the Central 
Peoples Government; or (b) concern the relationship between the Central 
Authorities and the Region.25 Such provisions are so-called excluded 
provisions.26 Provisions of the Basic Law that are not excluded provisions do 
not need to be referred to the NPCSC. The CFA called this query the 
classification test. 
Unfortunately, the CFA did not give any details about how to identify 
excluded provisions. It only assume[d] that Article 22(4) is an excluded 
provision on the sole basis that it concerns the relationship between the Central 
Authorities and the Region.27 The CFA also asserted, without evidence, that 
Article 24, being a provision within the limits of the Regions autonomy, is not 
an excluded provision.28 
2. Predominant Provision
Although the CFA found that Article 22(4) was an excluded provision and
Article 24 was not, this did not resolve the matter because the different 
questions of interpretation did not separate cleanly. The proper interpretation of 
Article 24 (the non-excluded provision) depended upon the interpretation of 
Article 22(4) (the excluded provision). Were the NPCSC to interpret Article 
22(4), it would indirectly determine the interpretation of Article 24. Should the 
NPCSC be allowed to do so? 
The CFA thought not. It declared that a main objective of Article 158(3) 
was to authorize the CFA to interpret on [its] own the provisions within the 
limits of the Regions autonomy.29 If the NPCSC could weigh in on the 
interpretation of non-excluded provisions, even indirectly, that would be a 
substantial derogation from the Regions autonomy and cannot be right.30 
Consequently, the CFA invented a predominant provision test: 
25 Ng Ka Ling, supra note 22, at ¶ 89. 
26 Id. at ¶ 86. 
27 Id. at ¶ 97. 
28  Id. at ¶ 99. 
29 Id. at ¶ 104 (internal quotes omitted). 
30 Id. at ¶ 102. 
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[A]s a matter of substance, what predominantly is the provision that has to 
be interpreted in the adjudication of the case? If the answer is an excluded 
provision, the Court is obliged to refer. If the answer is a provision which is 
not an excluded provision, then no reference has to be made, although an 
excluded provision is arguably relevant to the construction of the non-
excluded provision even to the extent of qualifying it.31 
Again, the CFA did not give any reasoning when it invented and then used this 
predominant provision test.32 It only asserted that Article 24 was predominant in 
this case. Thus, the CFA determined that there was no role for the NPCSC. The 
CFA proceeded to construe both Article 24 and Article 22(4), even though one 
of them was an excluded provision. 
3. Necessity 
The third test for judicial referral is the necessity test, although the CFA 
in Ng Ka Ling did not actually apply it.33 The necessity test asks whether the 
court needs to interpret any excluded provisions and if that interpretation would 
affect judgment in the case.34 If so, the CFA must refer the interpretation to the 
NPCSC. 
In Democratic Republic of the Congo v. FG Hemisphere Associates LLC,35 the CFA 
finally put the necessity test into practice. That case asked whether Hong Kong 
courts should apply an absolute or restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. In 
question were Articles 13 and 19 of the Basic Law, both of which, according to 
the CFA, plainly were excluded provisions.36 The CFA then applied the 
necessity test. Still, the treatment was cursory: 
[T]he [Democratic Republic of the Congo] has not waived its immunity. 
Hence the case cannot be resolved without a determination of the questions 
of interpretation affecting the meaning of Articles 13 and 19 of the Basic 
Law . . . The necessity condition is therefore satisfied.37 
The CFA has never provided any details about how to determine necessity. 
                                                 
31  Id. at ¶ 103. 
32  Po-Jen Yap, 10 Years of the Basic Law: The Rise, Retreat, and Resurgence of Judicial Power in Hong Kong, 36 
COMMON L. WORLD REV. 166, 171 (2007). 
33  Ng Ka Ling, supra note 22, at ¶ 89. 
34  Id. 
35  Dem. Rep. Congo v. F.G. Hemisphere Assocs., [2011] 1 H.K.C.F.A.R. 41 (C.F.A.) [hereinafter 
Congo]. 
36  Id. at ¶ 403. 
37  Id. at ¶ 406. 
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4. Arguability 
Finally, there is an arguability test. Congo explained it in this way: [O]nce 
the classification and the necessity conditions were satisfied there was a duty to 
make a reference of the question of interpretation if it was arguable but not if it 
was plainly and obviously bad.38 
Thus, Congo firmly identified arguability as a separate and final test, after 
classification and necessity, to deny a reference to any argument that was plainly 
and obviously bad. It is not clear how the arguability test gets applied because 
the CFA has never found an argument to have come close to failing it.39 
B. Confusion and Controversy  
1. Order of Operations 
The CFAs law on preliminary references is a mess. One serious question 
that has upset scholars is about the order of operations. Congo, the most recent 
case on point, articulated the four tests in this order: 1) classification, 2) 
predominant provision, 3) necessity, and 4) arguability.40 The CFA did not say 
that the order was strict, but government bodies41 and scholars have gone on to 
assume that it is orthodox. However, this strict order of operations is not 
consistent with logic or judicial economy. Scholars have expended considerable 
energy trying to make sense of it. 
Denis Chang and Albert Chen have debated whether the CFA is generally 
right to consider classification before necessity. The critical question is, 
according to Chang, [i] s there a need in this case to interpret an Excluded 
Provision?42 He argues that, to answer the question, one must first decide if one 
is dealing with an excluded provision.43 On the other hand, Chen argues that 
                                                 
38  Id. at ¶ 398 (citing Ng Ka Ling, supra note 22). 
39  See, for example, id. at ¶ 404 (We consider questions relating to Articles 13 and 19 clearly arguable. 
No other conclusion as to arguability is possible when regard is had to the conflicting views 
expressed in the courts below, particularly the division of opinion in the Court of Appeal.). 
40  See Congo, supra note 35, at ¶ 39598. 
41  The Legislative Council recites the tests in faithful order. Legislative Council Panel on 
Administration of Justice and Legal Services, LC Paper No. CB(2)1150/11-12(01), ¶¶ 1416 
https://perma.cc/UP84-SLSP. 
42  Denis Chang, The Reference to the Standing Committee of the National Peoples Congress under Article 158 of 
the Basic Law: The Question of Methodology, in HONG KONGS CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE: CONFLICT 
OVER INTERPRETATION 143, 143 (Johannes M. M. Chan et al. eds., 2000). 
43  Id. 
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there is no point in classifying a provision unless one finds that the provision is 
necessary for deciding the case.44 
Elsewhere, Cora Chan has questioned the sense behind the arguability test. 
She explains that either arguability is a standard of review for necessity, in which 
case it is not really a separate test,45 or it is a threshold question that should come 
before necessity.46 Chan is right to conclude that the CFA is confused about the 
rationale behind the arguability test. 
Clearly, the order of operations has become a source of significant anxiety 
for scholars. The most frustrating thing is that it should never have become a 
serious concern in the first place because a strict order of operations is illogical 
and useless. Not even the CFA itself follows the order closely.47 This Article 
argues that scholars should abandon any notion of an order of operations. 
2. Predominant Provision 
The second and more serious problem with the CFAs law on preliminary 
references is the predominant provision test. The CFA invented the test in Ng 
Ka Ling and refused to refer the interpretation of Article 22(4) to the NPCSC, 
even though Article 22(4) was an excluded provision. It was not because Article 
22(4) did not matter; it was only that Article 22(4) was not predominant over 
Article 24. 
The logic of the predominant provision test is indefensible if one considers 
the letter or the spirit of Article 158(3). In Ng Ka Ling, there was a legitimate 
                                                 
44  Albert Chen, The Court of Final Appeals Ruling in the Illegal Migrant Children Case, in HONG KONGS 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE: CONFLICT OVER INTERPRETATION 113, 116 (Johannes M. M. Chan et 
al. eds., 2000). 
45  Cora Chan, Implementing China and Hong Kongs Preliminary Reference System: Transposability of Article 
267 TFEU Principles, 2014 PUB. L. 642, 655 (2013) ([I]n deciding whether arguments for seeking 
reference are at least arguable, the court would inevitably have to consider whether the necessity 
and classification conditions are arguably satisfied. So, contrary to the CFAs analysis in Ng Ka 
Ling, arguability should not be treated as a separate stage of analysis.). 
46  Id. at 654 (suggesting that whenever the meaning of a provision can potentially affect the 
outcome of the present case, the provision is applicable and relevant to the case, and the necessity 
test is passed, regardless of whether the meaning of the provision is clear). 
47  The CFA has been utterly inconsistent about the placement of the arguability test. Congo, citing Ng 
Ka Ling, put the test last. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. Ng Ka Ling had actually put 
arguability first, saying, if the Court decides that it is arguable, the Court would then consider 
whether the classification and necessity conditions are satisfied. Ng Ka Ling, supra note 22, at 100. 
In actual application, the CFA has done neither of the above. In Ng Ka Ling, arguability was 
applied second, after classification but before predominant provision. See id. (In the present case, 
it is arguable that an excluded provision (Article 22(4)) is relevant to the interpretation of a non-
excluded provision (Article 24).). In Congo, arguability was applied third, right before necessity. 
See Congo, supra note 35, at 404 (We consider questions relating to Articles 13 and 19 clearly 
arguable.); id. at 405 (The only issue is whether the necessity condition is satisfied and it is to 
that issue we now turn.). 
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need to interpret Article 22(4) that affected the final judgment in the case. The 
plain meaning of Article 158(3) makes clear that such interpretation should be 
referred to the NPCSC. To take any other view, according to Chen, would be 
inconceivable.48 Furthermore, the NPCSC has a legitimate constitutional role 
to play in making authoritative interpretations of excluded provisions like Article 
22(4). Po Jen Yap argues that [w]here there are two conflicting Basic Law 
provisions, one which falls within the prerogative of the central government, 
ipso facto this conflict should be resolved by the Standing Committee.49 
The predominant provision test has been soundly discredited by authors 
like Chen,50 Yap, Pui Yin Lo,51 and Lawrence Li.52 But why would the CFA, a 
body of prominent and respectable judges, make up a legal test that it knew to 
be absurd from the start?53 The most logical explanation is that the CFA was 
trying desperately to avoid a reference because it regarded references to the 
NPCSC generally to be repulsive54a view that persists to the present day.55 
However, this is not consistent with the clear intention of the Basic Law,56 and 
this view must change if this area of constitutional law is to have any coherence. 
48  See Chen, supra note 44, at 115 (If one takes [the facts of the case] and reads again the relevant 
text of Article 158(3) . . . having regard to its ordinary, natural and plain meaning, I think it is 
inconceivable for one not to conclude that the CFA in this case was bound under Article 158(3) 
to refer the interpretation of Article 22(4) to the NPC Standing Committee.). 
49  Yap, supra note 32, at 172. 
50  See Albert Chen, Ng Ka Ling and Article 158(3) of the Basic Law, 20012002 J. CHINESE & COMP. L. 
222, 227. 
51  Pui Yin Lo argues that the predominant provision test cannot be an objective legal test because it 
is inherently biased. See PUI YIN LO, THE JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF HONG KONGS BASIC LAW:
COURTS, POLITICS AND SOCIETY AFTER 1997 378 (2014) ([The predominant provision test] is an 
exercise dependent on the proponents point of view.). 
52 See Lawrence Li, Dual System of Constitutional Interpretation: A Hong Kong Experience, 5 VIENNA J. 
INTL CONST. L. 572, 584 (2011) ([T]he arguability or predominant tests cannot justify a refusal 
to refer an excluded provision if the necessity condition is satisfied.). 
53 The CFA never took the predominant provision test seriously. See Yap, supra note 32, at 172 
([T]he CFA has been disingenuous about the application of [the predominant provision] test, as 
it paid scant attention as to how the predominant provision may be identified.). 
54 See LO, supra note 51, at 375 (arguing that the court in Ng Ka Ling had to find a way not to refer 
because of the significant symbolic value of that case to autonomy and judicial independence). 
55 See id. at 391 (arguing that, up through the case of Ng Siu Tung v. Director of Immigration, [2002] 1 
H.K.L.R.D. 561 (C.F.A.), there is apparently an entrenched institutional reluctance on the part of 
the Court of Final Appeal to make judicial references); LO, supra note 51, at 460 (arguing that the 
CFA actively tries to insulate itself from mainland influence). 
56  In its interpretation, the NPCSC criticized the CFA for failing to make the reference when it 
should have. See BASIC LAW, supra note 5, at Instrument 17. 
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III. A COMPARATIVE APPROACH 
A few things are apparent. The jurisprudence of Article 158(3) is 
convoluted and unclear. Certainly, it does not exemplify predictability and 
transparency, which are values in the common law tradition. If there is no fresh 
direction, judges and scholars may spend many more years trying to untangle the 
problems with the judicial reference procedure. By then, people may have lost 
patience with the Basic Law. 
However, it may not be necessary to dwell on the shortcomings in CFA 
case law if we take a slightly different approach to understanding Article 158(3). 
In particular, it is possible to take a comparative approach by returning to the 
original intention of the Basic Law text and gaining a straight-forward 
understanding of the judicial reference procedure. 
A. Similarities between Article 158(3) of the Basic Law and 
Article 267 of the TFEU 
The official introduction to the Basic Law confirms that Article 158(3) is 
adapted from TFEU Article 267: 
[The method of judicial reference] is adopted after consulting the measures 
for interpreting laws taken by the European Community . . . . [It] effectively 
helps to resolve the contradiction caused by the fact that the power of 
interpretation and the power of final adjudication are not vested in the same 
institution and ensures the unified understanding and implementation of the 
European Community laws in its Member States, which is worth our 
consideration.57 
The introduction goes on to note that, in general, E.U. practice has not 
impaired the judicial independence of lower courts.58 
Given the clear and deliberate transplant of TFEU Article 267 into Article 
158(3), it should be no surprise that they look similar: 
                                                 
57  See BASIC LAW, supra note 5. 
58  Id. at 217. 
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The similarities are self-evident. First, preliminary references are confined to 
certain subject matters that affect the rights and obligations of the higher-level 
government. In the case of the E.U., those subject matters encompass E.U. 
treaty articles, acts of E.U. institutions, and anything that forms part of the E.U. 
legal order.61 In the case of Hong Kong and the PRC, those encompass 
provisions concerning affairs which are the responsibility of the Central 
Peoples Government and the relationship between the Central Authorities 
and the Region.62 Matters that relate to exclusive powers of the lower-level 
government do not require a reference to the higher-level government. Also, 
preliminary references are only required where there is no further judicial 
remedy in the lower jurisdiction. Some other requirements in Article 158(3) that 
relate to judicial economy (namely, those regarding the need to interpret a 
                                                 
59  Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 267, Oct. 10, 
2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 165 [hereinafter TFEU]. 
60  BASIC LAW, supra note 5. 
61  DAMIAN CHALMERS, EUROPEAN UNION LAW: TEXT AND MATERIALS 16061 (3d ed. 2014) 
(Although Article 267 TFEU, thus, only talks of the Court giving rulings on the Treaties and acts 
of the EU institutions, the Court has, consequently, interpreted it more broadly to include 
anything which forms part of the wider EU legal order. This includes international agreements 
concluded prior to the establishment of the European Communities to which the Union has 
succeeded the Member States and general principles of law and fundamental rights.). 
62  See WANG, supra note 1. 
TFEU Article 267 (excerpted) 
 
Where any such question [concerning the 
interpretation of the Treaties or the 
validity and interpretation of acts of the 
institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of 
the Union] is raised in a case pending 
before a court or tribunal of a Member 
State against whose decisions there is no 
judicial remedy under national law, that 
court or tribunal shall bring the matter 
before the Court.59 
Basic Law Article 158(3) (excerpted) 
 
[I]f the courts of the Region, in 
adjudicating cases, need to interpret the 
provisions of this Law concerning affairs 
which are the responsibility of the 
Central Peoples Government, or 
concerning the relationship between the 
Central Authorities and the Region, and 
if such interpretation will affect the 
judgments on the cases, the courts of the 
Region shall, before making their final 
judgments which are not appealable, seek 
an interpretation of the relevant 
provisions from the [NPCSC] through 
the Court of Final Appeal of the 
Region.60 
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provision that will affect the judgements on the cases) have parallels not in 
TFEU Article 267 but in early E.U. case law.63 
Similarity is a natural and desired consequence of adaptation. Adaptation 
makes sense because the intended functions of preliminary reference are the 
same in both jurisdictions. In the E.U., Member States confer power upward to 
the E.U., while in China, the central government confers power downward to 
Hong Kong. But regardless of which direction the conferral of power flows, the 
function of preliminary reference is equally valid. In the E.U., preliminary 
reference seeks to achieve a uniform interpretation of E.U. laws and the 
effective implementation of those laws across all Member States with their 
different legal traditions.64 The Basic Law is law in Hong Kong and in the PRC 
at large, and, as such, its interpretation and implementation must not clash with 
the other laws and Constitution of the PRC.65 Legal uniformity in the PRC 
means a consistent interpretation of relevant PRC law as applied to Hong Kong 
and to other parts of the PRC. 
Most interpretations and implementations of the Basic Law will not create 
conflict with the other laws and Constitution of the PRC. The very intention of 
One Country, Two Systems is to provide for a significant separation of legal 
systems such that the systems seldom clash. The provisions of the Basic Law 
that are likely to interact with the laws and Constitution of the PRC are the 
excluded provisions (again, provisions concerning affairs which are the 
responsibility of the Central Peoples Government, or concerning the 
relationship between the Central Authorities and the Region). Excluded 
provisions, by definition, affect the government of Hong Kong as well as the 
rights and duties of the central government. Where the practices of multiple 
governments intersect, there ought to be a mechanism for achieving a consistent 
understanding of law between them. 
From time to time, the similarity of Basic Law Article 158(3) and TFEU 
Article 267 has been noted in the scholarly literature.66 However, most authors 
regard the similarities as being merely superficial. A few authors see limited 
                                                 
63  See Section III.B.13, infra. 
64  See, for example, Case 314/85, Firma Foto-Frost v. Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost, 1987 E.C.R. 4199, 
¶ 15 ([T]he main purpose of the powers accorded to the Court by [TFEU Article 267] is to 
ensure that Community law is applied uniformly by national courts.). 
65  Regarding the necessity of NPCSC interpretation, see WANG, supra note 1, at 213 ([O]nly when 
the Central Authorities have the power to interpret the Law can unified understanding and 
implementation of the Law be guaranteed throughout the country.). 
66  See, for example, Firma Foto-Frost, supra note 64; WANG, supra note 1. 
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applications in the comparison.67 Most authors focus on fatal differences 
between the Hong Kong setup and the E.U. setup, and conclude that no 
comparison is useful.68 Here again, the complaints are primarily that the NPCSC 
is not a judicial body and that it makes interpretations outside the course of 
litigation. 
It ought to strike more people that neither complaint, at least 
formalistically, condemns the Basic Law regime. Constitutions do not have to be 
solely interpreted by courts. Elsewhere in the world, they are interpreted by 
legislatures, including in Finland, where a committee of the Finnish Parliament, 
not a court, is the final interpreter.69 In other countries like the U.K. that have a 
principle of parliamentary sovereignty, legislatures pass ordinary legislation to 
reverse constitutional judgments of courts (leaving previously rendered 
judgments unaffected, of course).70 Furthermore, in some countries, courts 
render advisory opinions outside the course of litigation. For example, in 
Canada, the Supreme Court entertains reference questions about 
constitutional issues from the federal cabinet and provincial governments.71 Ten 
states of the U.S. allow their supreme courts to provide advisory opinions to the 
states executives or legislatures, usually about constitutional issues.72 All of the 
above jurisdictions are paragons of the rule of law. 
Finally, the fact remains that Basic Law Article 158(3) was intended to 
emulate TFEU Article 267, so a coherent legal practice should strive to give 
effect to that intent. None of the foregoing complaints undermine the major 
goal of preliminary referencesto achieve uniform interpretation of laws where 
multiple levels of government have rights and obligations. Comparison between 
                                                 
67  See, for example, Chan, supra note 45, at 655 (seeing room for adoption of the doctrine of acte 
éclairé but not acte clair); Chen, supra note 44, at 121 (seeing value in E.U. law for learning the 
meaning of necessity). 
68  See, for example, JAMES CRAWFORD, RIGHTS IN ONE COUNTRY: HONG KONG AND CHINA 9 (2005); 
Mark Elliott & Christopher Forsyth, The Rule of Law in Hong Kong: Immigrant Children, the Court of 
Final Appeal and the Standing Committee of the National Peoples Congress, 2000 ASIA PAC. L. REV. 53, 72 
(2016). 
69  See Markku Suksi, Finland, in HOW CONSTITUTIONS CHANGE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 87 (Dawn 
Oliver & Carlo Fusaro eds., 2011). 
70  See Zhenmin Wang, A Decade of Hong Kong Basic Law Actualization, in CHINAS HONG KONG 
TRANSFORMED: RETROSPECTS AND PROSPECTS BEYOND THE FIRST DECADE 155, 165 (Ming K. 
Chan ed., 2008). 
71  See Tsvi Kahana, Canada, in HOW CONSTITUTIONS CHANGE, supra note 69, at 9. The similarity 
between Hong Kong and Canada was also noted by Pui Yin Lo. See LO, supra note 51, at 412 
n. 180. 
72  MEL A. TOPF, A DOUBTFUL AND PERILOUS EXPERIMENT: ADVISORY OPINIONS, STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, AND JUDICIAL SUPREMACY ix (2011). 
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Basic Law Article 158(3) and TFEU Article 267 remains valid, and it ought to be 
explored much more deeply. 
B. Preliminary Reference Procedure of the E.U.
At todays historical juncture, given the similar origins, structures, and
functions of Basic Law Article 158 and TFEU Article 267, it is sensible to ask 
again whether Hong Kongs judicial reference procedure can be improved by 
more closely following the E.U.s example.  
The relevant law of the E.U. can be summed up briefly: when national 
courts encounter a question about E.U. law, they can initiate a discretionary or 
non-discretionary referral to the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(European Court of Justice, or ECJ).73 Discretionary referrals are available to any 
court, of any level, at any stage of proceedings. In effect, the right of 
discretionary referral empowers every court in the E.U. to be an active 
participant in E.U. law.74 Discretionary referrals impose no obligations on any 
courts, and they are not consequential to the topic of this article. 
Non-discretionary referrals are required by TFEU Article 267 whenever a 
national court faces a question of E.U. law and there is no further judicial 
remedy. However, there are three exceptions of judicial economy in the case law: 
irrelevant question, acte éclairé, and acte clair. 
1. Irrelevant Question
The irrelevant question doctrine proposes that national courts should not
refer questions that are not relevant to the outcome of a case. The concept was 
clearly stated in Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v. Ministry of Health:75 
[The] mere fact that a party contends that the dispute gives rise to a 
question concerning the interpretation of Community law does not mean 
that the court or tribunal concerned is compelled to [refer it to the Court of 
Justice]. . . . 
73  PAUL CRAIG & GRÁINNE DE BÚRCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS 468 (6th ed. 2015) 
(Article 267 TFEU draws a distinction between courts or tribunals with a discretion to refer to 
the CJEU, Article 267(2), and courts or tribunals against whose decisions there is no judicial 
remedy under national law, Article 267(3), which have an obligation to refer, provided that a 
decision on a question is necessary to enable judgment to be given.). 
  CHALMERS, supra note 61, at 170 (All national courts are granted equal possibilities to make a 
reference to the Court of Justice and no national court can disenfranchise another national 
court. . . . For lower courts, scornful of higher courts or feeling unduly constrained by national 
judicial hierarchies, the EU judicial order is one which offers them many opportunities.).
75  Case 283/81, Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v. Ministry of Health, 1982 E.C.R. 3415 
[hereinafter CILFIT]. 
Chicago Journal of International Law 
18 Vol. 19 No. 1 
[National] courts or tribunals are not obliged to refer to the Court of Justice 
a question concerning the interpretation of Community law raised before 
them if that question is not relevant, that is to say, if the answer to that 
question, regardless of what it may be, can in no way affect the outcome of 
the case.76 
Importantly, it is up to the national courts own discretion whether a 
question is relevant or not.77 
2. Acte Éclairé
The acte éclairé doctrine says that national courts do not have to refer a
question where the answer is already clear from a previous ruling of the ECJ. 
The concept was articulated in the case of Da Costa en Schaake v. Nederlandse 
Belastingadministratie:78 
Although [TFEU Article 267] unreservedly requires [national courts of final 
instance] to refer to the Court every question of interpretation raised before 
them, the authority of an interpretation under [Article 267] already given by 
the Court may deprive the obligation of its purpose and thus empty it of its 
substance. Such is the case especially when the question raised is materially 
identical with a question which has already been the subject of a preliminary 
ruling in a similar case.79 
Acte éclairé is valid even if the previous ruling was directed to a different court in 
a different member state, or even if the questions of interpretation are not 
strictly identical.80 One can think of acte éclairé as a sort of stare decisis in E.U. law. 
3. Acte Clair
 The acte clair doctrine allows national courts to omit referrals where 
the interpretation of E.U. law is so obvious from the text that there is no room 
for reasonable doubt.81 Obviousness, of course, is viewed from the perspective 
of the ECJ and the entire E.U.82 Again, the main authority is CILFIT: 
The correct application of Union law may be so obvious as to leave no 
scope for any reasonable doubt as to the manner in which the question 
raised is to be resolved. Before it comes to the conclusion that such is the 
case, the national court or tribunal must be convinced that the matter is 
equally obvious to the courts of the other Member States and to the Court 
76 Id. at ¶¶ 910. 
77 Id. at ¶ 10. 
78 Cases 28-30/62, Da Costa en Schaake v. Nederlandse Belastingadministratie, 1963 E.C.R. 31. 
79 Id. 
80 See CRAIG & DE BÚRCA, supra note 73, at 451. 
81 Case 495/03, Intermodal Transports BV v. Staatssecretaris van Financiën, 2005 E.C.R. I-8151, 
¶ 39. 
82 Id. 
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of Justice. Only if those conditions are satisfied may the national court or 
tribunal refrain from submitting the question to the Court of Justice and 
take upon itself the responsibility for resolving it.83 
The exception provided by acte clair is a narrow one, and it is debated 
whether national courts are truly capable of knowing what is obvious to the 
ECJ.84 Some scholars argue that acte clair is actually a political valve, disguised 
as a legal rule to let national courts escape referrals when they are unwilling to 
make them.85 Others say that acte clair might induce courts of different levels to 
cooperate more by promoting trust between them.86 Still others speculate that 
some national courts may have abused acte clair,87 but so far there has been no 
complaint from the ECJ. 
IV. LESSONS FOR HONG KONG FROM THE E.U. 
The E.U. treaty and rules of judicial economy have much to teach Hong 
Kong about the practice of preliminary references because there is a complete 
parallelism between the procedures of the E.U. and Hong Kong. The text of 
TFEU Article 267 echoes the functions that the CFA tries to achieve with its 
classification test. The E.U. case law echoes the functions of the necessity 
and arguability tests, except that the E.U. rules are much more developed. 
There is no E.U. parallel to the predominant provision test, which has been 
discredited and serves no legitimate purpose. 
By making comparisons to the E.U. law, it becomes easy to understand at 
least two major mistakes in the current scholarship about preliminary references 
in Hong Kong: first is the continuing argument over order of operations; second 
is the overly restrictive attitude towards implementing E.U.-style rules of judicial 
economy. This section addresses both of these mistakes. 
A. No Order of Operations  
In E.U. law, there is no fixed ordering to the preliminary reference rules or 
exceptions. A national court need only follow logic and expediency, so if it finds 
any one reason not to refer, it can dispose of the argument on that basis alone. 
This point should be instructive for Hong Kong. 
In fact, there is nothing in the text or the fundamental logic of the Basic 
Law that demands an order of operations. If a referral can be rejected based on 
                                                 
83  CILFIT, supra note 75, at ¶ 16. 
84  CHALMERS, supra note 61, at 189. 
85  Id. at 189. 
86  CRAIG & DE BÚRCA, supra note 73, at 457. 
87  CHALMERS, supra note 61, at 190. 
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any one condition, then there is no point in looking at any others. A legal test 
should address what is logically necessary to dispose of the question; no more, 
no less. 
As mentioned earlier, the CFA itself has never acknowledged a strict order 
of operations. Its existence is more a product of misunderstanding by others. 
However, it has attracted much scholarly attention, and it is high time that 
scholars, or the CFA itself, call for an end to it. Certainly, the ECJ finds no value 
in an order of operations, and neither should Hong Kong.  
B. Judicial Economy 
This Article argues that all the E.U. rules for judicial economy can be 
emulated in Hong Kong. The irrelevant question doctrine is already in force in 
Hong Kong because it is implied by the necessity and arguability tests. It is 
also reasonable to say that the CFA, being a common law court, will not refer 
hypothetical questions that are not genuinely disputable or are not necessary for 
deciding a concrete case. 
The acte éclairé doctrine, if applied to Hong Kong, suggests that the CFA 
should use previous interpretations of the NPCSC to resolve substantially 
similar questions in the future, without further reference. The CFA has not had 
any opportunity to put such doctrine into practice, although it would probably 
not be controversial.88 
The acte clair doctrine, if applied to Hong Kong, suggests that the CFA 
should be able to decide a case without reference if it is obvious how the 
NPCSC would interpret the relevant provision. Clearly, a court should be 
cautious before presuming to know what another court would decide, and this 
practice would be especially controversial in Hong Kong. 
The current view in the literature is that Hong Kong cannot use acte clair89 
because the CFA and NPCSC use completely contradictory forms of 
interpretation. For example, the CFA only ever uses the English version of the 
Basic Law while the NPCSC uses the Chinese version, yet it is the Chinese 
version that prevails in case of discrepancy.90 Even more problematic is the fact 
that the CFA and NPCSC operate under completely different legal systems; the 
CFA does not have the institutional competence to understand the Basic Law 
                                                 
88   See Chan, supra note 45, at 655 (The exception of acte éclairé . . . is applicable to Hong Kong. In 
fact . . . it necessarily flows from . . . the text of art.158(3).). 
89  Id. at 654 ([T]here is no room for the CFA to apply any form of [acte clair] once it has 
determined that the meaning of an excluded provision can potentially affect the outcome of the 
case.); see also LO, supra note 51, at 432 (discussing acte clair but not advocating for its application 
to Hong Kong). 
90  Chan, supra note 45, at 658. 
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using Chinese legal principles.91 One Chinese legal principle that is often 
maligned is the use of legislative intent. Legislative intent calls for the use of 
materials that are outside of the statutory language, and sometimes, as applied by 
the NPCSC, it changes the final result that the CFA otherwise found.92 If the 
CFA and the NPCSC use such fundamentally different systems of interpretation, 
scholars argue, then the CFA can never be sure, without reasonable doubt,93 
how the NPCSC would interpret anything. 
Clearly, there are stark differences between the legal traditions of the CFA 
and NPCSC. However, overemphasizing the differences in their forms of legal 
interpretation is problematic. First, it is too dismissive of the CFAs intellect. 
The Basic Law is a PRC statute, but so too are NPCSC interpretations (which 
have statutory force under the Chinese legal system). If the CFA is incompetent 
to read the Basic Law for itself, can it read NPCSC interpretations? Can the 
CFA implement instructions from a body that it cannot purport to understand? 
The CFA must be given more credit. Secondly, focusing on the differences 
between forms of legal interpretation does not promote judicial economy. In any 
legal system, there must be consideration for the efficient use of judicial 
resources. If the CFA cannot presume to know anything about Basic Law 
interpretation, how can it decide what questions are necessary or arguable?94 
If the CFA has to refer even the most trivial questions, how does that square 
with autonomy and judicial independence? 
                                                 
91  See id. at 654 (But the CFA is not a Chinese court. There is no constitutional basis for it to adopt 
Chinese methods of interpretation. Nor is it institutionally equipped to second-guess how a 
Chinese body may interpret a provision.). 
92  The judgment in Ng Ka Ling was questioned by the Chief Executive, then overturned by the 
NPCSC, because the CFAs result was inconsistent with legislative intent. See Information Note 
from the Legislative Council Secretariat, Interpretation of the Basic Law under Article 158(1) 
(IN29/1112), at 2.12.2 (The HKSAR Government considered that CFAs interpretation of 
the relevant provisions of the Basic Law was not consistent with the legislative intent. On 18 May 
1999, the Chief Executive reported to the State Council the problems he had encountered in the 
implementation of the Basic Law and sought for its assistance to seek an interpretation from 
NPCSC on the legislative intent of Articles 22(4) and 24(2)(3).); BASIC LAW Instrument 17 
([T]he interpretation of the Court of Final Appeal is not consistent with the legislative intent.). 
The CFA later refused to follow what was known to be an expression of legislative intent and 
decided the case by itself in Ng Siu Tung v. Director of Immigration, [2002] 5 H.K.C.F.A.R. 1. 
93  Cf. Intermodal Transports, supra note 81, at ¶ 34 (that the standard of review must be no reasonable 
doubt as to how the law is to be interpreted). 
94  Cora Chan draws two contradictory conclusions: first, rejecting adoption of acte clair in Hong 
Kong for reasons mentioned above; and second, encouraging the CFA to draw inspiration from 
the . . . principles on acte clair, such as looking at different language versions of the Basic Law, 
to determine arguability. Chan, supra note 45, at 661. It is not clear why the CFA on its own 
should have competence to read the Basic Law for arguability but not for clear meaning, since the 
skills involved would be the same. 
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It is the opinion of this Article that Hong Kong can and should emulate 
the doctrine of acte clair. Doing so would require lawyers and judges to adjust 
their mindset, but the overall task is not as impossible as some people have 
feared. The following subsections describe how it can be done. 
1. Distinguish Legal Acts from Political Acts 
Some complain that the NPCSC sometimes makes Basic Law 
interpretations in an arbitrary manner. Part of this perception comes from too 
narrow an understanding of the NPCSCs role. Lawyers need to recognize the 
mixed legislative and judicial roles of the NPCSC. The NPCSC is unlike 
anything that exists in the common law because it is at once the parliament and 
the constitutional court of the PRC. Since the NPCSC has multiple functions, it 
is important to distinguish its political acts from its judicial acts. Its acts 
regarding the Basic Law may be either, or both. 
When commentators debate about interpretations of the Basic Law by 
the NPCSC, often they are referring to eight documents that are appended to 
the Basic Law, known as Instruments 17 through 23 and 25.95 Although these 
instruments express the NPCSCs views on the Basic Law, they are not all 
interpretations in the legal sense. The NPCSC itself is careful to distinguish them 
by name. Three of the Instruments (19, 21, and 23) are called decisions and 
are political (that is, legislative) in nature; the other five (17, 18, 20, 22, and 25) 
are called interpretations and are legal (that is, judicial) in nature. 
Instruments 19, 21, and 23 of the Basic Law are NPCSC decisions 
regarding election reform in Hong Kong. They are political acts. Certain election 
methods are hard-wired into the Basic Law itself, and changes to them require 
constitutional amendments. The substance of constitutional amendments cannot 
be found in any law because they are political questions, requiring political 
consensus from many different parties. In Hong Kong, election reform is a joint 
decision of the NPCSC, the Chief Executive of Hong Kong, and the Legislative 
Council of Hong Kong. Instruments 19, 21, and 23 are political statements of 
the NPCSC, in which the NPCSC expresses what it is willing to amend as one of 
the stakeholders in the Basic Law. In contrast, Instruments 17, 18, 20, 22, and 25 
are interpretations in the legal sense. For example, in Instrument 22, the NPCSC 
                                                 
95  BASIC LAW, supra note 5, at Instrument 17 (interpreting article 22(4) and article 24); id. at 
Instrument 18 (interpreting Annex I article 7 and Annex II article III); id. at Instrument 19 (ruling 
on issues related to Chief Executive and Legislative Council elections); id. at Instrument 20 
(interpreting article 53(2)); id. at Instrument 21 (ruling on issues related to Chief Executive and 
Legislative Council elections and on issues related to universal suffrage); id. at Instrument 22 
(interpreting article 13(1) and article 19); id. at Instrument 23 (ruling on issues related to election 
of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage and on Legislative Council elections); id. at 
Instrument 25 (interpreting article 104). 
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ruled on the nature and scope of sovereign immunity in Hong Kong lawsuits.96 
These are more consistent with what common law lawyers recognize as legal 
acts. 
It is important to distinguish between political and legal acts of the NPCSC 
because legal doctrines such as acte clair can only be applied to legal 
interpretation. While Hong Kong lawyers may have trouble understanding the 
NPCSCs political decisions, they are much more familiar with the legal 
interpretations. With this caveat, understanding how the NPCSC interprets laws 
and applying acte clair in Hong Kong is not unmanageable. 
2. Expand the Concept of Hong Kong Law 
In order to implement acte clair, the CFA must be competent to interpret 
laws from the point of view of the NPCSC.97 To some commentators, this 
appears to be a perverse task because the CFA has no understanding of Chinese 
legal methods.98 However, there are significant precedents for the CFA to 
follow. 
Hong Kongs former colonial master, the U.K., seamlessly adapted to civil 
law in the E.U. prior to Brexit. Since 1973, English common law has been 
subordinated to a new legal order under the (mostly civil) E.U. law, including 
giving up certain powers of final interpretation to the ECJ. Such a combination 
of English common law with E.U. law was once a very radical thing,99 but it is 
no longer. Early on, eminent jurists encouraged English lawyers to adapt to a 
new way of thinking, for, as Lord Denning pointed out, the techniques in civil 
law are not utterly incomprehensible to common lawyers.100 Those skeptical of 
comparative techniques will argue that a hybrid approach, such as of a common 
law lawyer practicing civil law, will never yield exactly what the civil law 
intended, and perhaps this is true. However, for many decades, English lawyers 
                                                 
96  BASIC LAW, supra note 5, at Instrument 22 (ruling that Hong Kong laws rules on state immunity 
must be subject to such modifications, adaptations, limitations or exceptions as are necessary so 
as to be consistent with the rules or policies on state immunity that the Central Peoples 
Government has determined). 
97  LO, supra note 51, at 432 (The question that should be asked is: Maybe it is clear to us, but how 
about to them?). 
98  See, for example, Chan, supra note 45, at 654 ([T]he CFA is not a Chinese court. There is no 
constitutional basis for it to adopt Chinese methods of interpretation. Nor is it institutionally 
equipped to second-guess how a Chinese body may interpret a provision.). 
99  For example, Lord Denning once noted that the practice of the ECJ was completely shocking to 
the old-fashioned English. Wang, supra note 70, at 168 (quoting ALFRED DENNING, WHAT NEXT 
IN THE LAW 293 (1982)). 
100  Lord Denning said, Just as in Rome you should do as Rome does, so in the European 
Community, you should do as the European Court does. Zhenmin Wang, supra note 70, at 168 
(quoting ALFRED DENNING, THE DISCIPLINE OF LAW 21 (1979)). 
Chicago Journal of International Law 
 24 Vol. 19 No. 1 
have been practicing E.U. law successfully, and nobody nowadays finds it 
untoward. What is done by English lawyers can be done by Hong Kong lawyers, 
too. 
To use acte clair, Hong Kong lawyers must adapt to Chinese methods of 
legal interpretation. The idea has not always been anathema. Shortly after the 
handover, some lawyers were optimistic that such a thing could be done. In the 
famous 1997 case HKSAR v. Ma Wai Kwan David,101 Justice Mortimer said in 
obiter: 
[The Basic Law] is Chinese law applicable to Hong Kong which falls initially 
to be interpreted by Hong Kong courts used to interpreting laws passed in 
the common law tradition, applying common law principles. No doubt, 
from time to time, difficult questions of interpretation will arise, but not, it 
seems to me, from any inherent difficulty arising between the two traditions. 
The common law principles of interpretation, as developed in recent years, 
are sufficiently wide and flexible to purposively interpret the plain language 
of this semi-constitutional law. The influence of international covenants has 
modified the common law principles of interpretation.102 
Therefore, Hong Kong lawyers do not have to be puzzled by Chinese civil 
law. For example, when faced with a question of legislative intent under Chinese 
law, common law lawyers may find, as Justice Mortimer did, that legislative 
intent is not so radically different in function from the purposive 
interpretation that is used under common law. 
From time to time, reputable Hong Kong lawyers find themselves 
interpreting Chinese law. On one occasion, the Hong Kong Bar Association had 
the confidence to analyze and construe an NPCSC decision, in Chinese, with 
reference to the intent of the drafter, couched in the terms of legal reasoning 
that are familiar to every common law lawyer.103 The Bar Association felt 
compelled to discuss the drafters intent because the Court of Final Appeal has 
consistently emphasized that, in constitutional interpretation, one must have 
regard to the context and purpose of the instrument and the relevant provision 
of the instrument to be construed.104 The Bar Associations analysis was 
precisely the kind of exercise that would prepare its members to apply acte clair. 
All of this is to argue that Hong Kong lawyers should learn Chinese 
methods of legal interpretation, even if it requires some effort. What might also 
                                                 
101  HKSAR v. Ma Wai Kwan David, [1997] H.K.L.R.D. 761 (C.A.). 
102  Id. at 364-C. 
103  The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government, Consultation Document on 
Methods for Selecting the Chief Executive in 2017 and for Forming the Legislative Council in 
2016: Submission of the Hong Kong Bar Association, at 20 (discussing the difference between 
the Chinese terms may/  and must/  in the Basic Law). 
104  Id. 
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be helpful is more judicial dialogue between the CFA and NPCSC so that 
lawyers can observe interpretation of the Basic Law in action. The successful 
mingling of different legal systems takes a bit of time and experience. 
However, it is absolutely necessary for the CFAs practice and the 
NPCSCs practice to become compatible with each other, because, under the 
unique legal order of the Basic Law, Hong Kong law is no longer merely common 
law, in the same way that English law is no longer merely common law. Certain 
aspects of PRC law find their way into Hong Kong law via Article 158(3) and 
other provisions. To be fully competent in todays Hong Kong law necessarily 
requires knowledge of PRC law. This implicates a major change from the current 
legal education model in Hong Kong. 
If Hong Kong could come to grips with its unique legal order and practice 
it successfully, then it could truly use the experience of TFEU Article 267 that it 
was intended to inherit. Hong Kong could then fully adopt the E.U. doctrines 
for judicial economy, which would strengthen the CFAs role as an active builder 
of Basic Law jurisprudence. 
V. DOCTRINE OF SINCERE COOPERATION
When using E.U. law as a model, it is important to remember that all E.U. 
treaty provisions exist against a background of certain general principles. In the 
context of judicial references, the most relevant principle is the doctrine of 
sincere cooperation.105 Sincere cooperation imposes crucial duties upon all 
participants.106 On the one hand, the ECJ trusts national courts to apply E.U. 
law correctly and to refer questions without hesitation. On the other hand, 
national courts also trust the ECJ to give high-quality, reasoned opinions that are 
easily understood and applied. Sincere cooperation can be viewed as a kind of 
institutional comity, where every institution performs its duties and obligations 
to all others. 
There is no written equivalent of sincere cooperation in the Basic Law. 
However, if Basic Law Article 158(3) is intended to be a true imitation of TFEU 
Article 267, which the drafting history suggests it to be, then it is reasonable to 
infer that Article 158(3) must reflect sincere cooperation in practice. The 
105  Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 3, Oct. 26 
2012, O.J. (C 326 13). 
106  Case C-2/88, Imm. J. J. Zwartveld & Others, 1990 E.C.R. I-4406, ¶¶ 1718 ([The principle of 
sincere cooperation] not only requires the Member States to take all the measures necessary to 
guarantee the application and effectiveness of Community law, . . . but also imposes on Member 
States and the Community institutions mutual duties of sincere cooperation. This duty of sincere 
cooperation imposed on Community institutions is of particular importance vis-à-vis the judicial 
authorities of the Member States, who are responsible for ensuring that Community law is applied 
and respected in the national legal system.). 
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questions then become, how should Hong Kong practice sincere cooperation, 
and what problems would it solve? 
In the context of Article 158(3), sincere cooperation calls for increasing the 
institutional comity between the CFA and the NPCSC and, more generally, 
comity between the legal systems of Hong Kong and mainland China. In fact, 
there are several legal principles in Hong Kong that point in the direction of 
institutional comity. 
One of the legal principles that calls for institutional comity is the high 
degree of autonomy. This phrase is repeated in the Sino-British Joint 
Declaration and the Basic Law itself.107 It represents a commitment by the 
Central Peoples Government, though everyone lives under the Constitution of 
the PRC, to entrust most of the running of Hong Kong to local authorities. That 
is to say, the central authority will not contradict the regional authority on 
regional matters, but the regional authority must defer to the central authority on 
the few areas that remain central matters. This principle has largely been 
respected. In the vast areas of the Basic Law that concern local affairs, over 
which the CFA exercises final interpretation and adjudication, the NPCSC has 
not interfered.108 
Another principle that echoes institutional comity is the exhortation to 
love the motherland and Hong Kong. This phrase was coined by Deng 
Xiaoping to explain that China expected Hong Kongs leaders to109 respect the 
nation, uphold One Country, Two Systems, and protect Hong Kongs prosperity 
and stability after 1997.110 Dengs phrase has become controversial lately because 
of its appearance in the even more controversial White Paper of June 2014.111 
Among other things, the White Paper reaffirmed, using Dengs words, that 
107  See Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong, China-U.K., ¶ 3(2), Dec. 19, 
1984, 1399 U.N.T.S. 33; BASIC LAW, supra note 5, at art. 2. 
108  See generally Yap, supra note 32, at § V. 
109  Xiaoping Deng, Maintain Prosperity and Stability in Hong Kong, in 3 SELECTED WORKS OF DENG
XIAOPING 80, 82 (1984) (There is only one requirement for [administrators of Hong Kong after 
1997]: they must be patriots, that is, people who love the motherland and Hong Kong.). 
110  Xiaoping Deng, One Country, Two Systems, in 3 SELECTED WORKS OF DENG XIAOPING, supra note 
109, at 68, 70 (It must be required that patriots form the main body of administrators, that is, of 
the future government of the Hong Kong special region. . . . A patriot is one who respects the 
Chinese nation, sincerely supports the motherlands resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong 
and wishes not to impair Hong Kongs prosperity and stability. . . . We dont demand that they be 
in favour of Chinas socialist system; we only ask them to love the motherland and Hong Kong.) 
111  Information Office of the State Council of the Peoples Republic of China, The Practice of the 
One Country, Two Systems Policy in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (White 
Paper) (June 10, 2014) https://perma.cc/8UDT-SLX5. 
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government officials, including judges, ought to be patriots with loyalty to 
ones country.112 
To some people in Hong Kong, loyalty to ones country sounds sinister, 
but legal scholars should not read controversy into these words. Elsewhere, 
central government officials have emphasized that loyalty to the country means 
supporting the principle of One Country, Two Systems; it includes not 
opposing the central government, which means not advocating for the 
overthrow of the Central Government, the Constitution of the PRC, or the 
respective political and economic systems of mainland China and Hong Kong.113 
Respect for the other governments and upholding the basic constitutional 
structure would seem to be minimum expectations preceding institutional 
comity. 
The principle of sincere cooperation would also require a more 
constructive use of the judicial reference process. First, the CFA should openly 
accept its constitutional duty of judicial referral and put the duty into practice. It 
cannot claim that it understands Article 158(3) but then avoid references using 
dubious legal theories. Second, the NPCSC should provide sufficient reasoning 
and analysis for its interpretations, so as to educate the end user about its 
methods and concerns. It is not the NPCSCs habit to do so.114 Recently, the 
NPCSC took a step in the right direction when it issued a separate, explanatory 
document on its ruling about the scope of sovereign immunity.115 Future 
explanations could be even more detailed, in the manner of common law judicial 
opinions, and incorporated into the text of the interpretation itself. In the 
interest of sincere cooperation, the NPCSC should equip the CFA with 
sufficient knowledge to be able to use acte clair or to interpret the Basic Law 
consistently. 
Sincere cooperation requires focused effort from many sides, but it is 
valuable to the development of Hong Kong constitutional law if it can be 
realized. Sincere cooperation would build up a sufficient body of Basic Law 
interpretations from which lawyers can learn and extrapolate. Ultimately, it 
                                                 
112  Id. at § V.3. 
113  See, for example, Kahon Chan, Definition of Love the Country Love Hong Kong Very Clear, CHINA 
DAILY ASIA (Dec. 20, 2013). 
114  See Anthony Mason, The Rule of Law in the Shadow of a Giant: The Hong Kong Experience, 33 SYDNEY 
L. REV. 623, 642 (2011) ([The NPCSC] provides little in the way of reasoning for its interpretive 
conclusion [so they] have not constructed a corpus of constitutional law on which the Hong 
Kong courts could draw, even assuming it to be legitimate to do so.). 
115  Fei Li, The Explanations on the Draft Interpretation of Paragraph 1, Article 13 and Article 19 of 
the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the Peoples Republic of 
China by the Standing Committee of the National Peoples Congress, 22nd Sess. Standing 
Committee of the Eleventh National Peoples Congress (Aug. 24, 2011). 
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would create a reputable and prestigious jurisprudence that would make the 
Basic Law worthy of its constitutional name. 
VI. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE COURT OF FINAL APPEAL 
This Article has made a number of suggestions that require effort from 
many different actors, but one actor is the most important of all: the CFA. 
Meaningful change will not begin without movement from the CFA. To that 
end, this Article recommends several actions that the CFA should undertake at 
the earliest opportunity. 
First, the CFA should abandon the Ng Ka Ling test. It is an unfortunate 
relic that is no longer defensible. The CFA should start afresh and base its rules 
on doctrines that are consistent with the intent and design of the constitutional 
order. The CFA has the opportunity to demonstrate that it has a sophisticated 
understanding of its constitutional interplay with the NPCSC and shape new 
jurisprudence to suit the needs of Hong Kong. 
Second, the CFA should remember and draw inspiration from the origins 
of Article 158(3). The CFA should establish a new preliminary reference 
jurisprudence that is based on the most important aspects of E.U. law. The two 
most obvious and immediate targets are the irrelevant question and acte éclairé 
doctrines. The CFA is well-placed to implement these on its own. 
Third, the CFA should take the initiative to understand Chinese legal 
interpretive methods. It should lead by example, addressing these methods in its 
judgments, and in doing so encourage practitioners to use Chinese legal 
arguments. Once the CFA achieves a high level of understanding of Chinese 
interpretive methods, the NPCSC would then have a basis to trust that the CFA 
is a competent partner implementing the Basic Law in Hong Kong. In other 
words, the CFA would gain the benefit of the doubt, and the NPCSC would be 
more content to let the CFA do its work. 
Finally, the CFA should engage in constructive dialogue with the NPCSC. 
To do so, the CFA should make preliminary references liberally, even 
enthusiastically. At the same time, the CFA should ask the NPCSC for legal 
reasoning. At a suitable time, with a sufficient acquis and a firm grasp of Chinese 
interpretive methods, the CFA should attempt a doctrine of acte clair. In this way, 
the CFA would practice acte clair in a convincing way that makes scholars, 
practitioners, and the NPCSC believe in this transplant from E.U. law. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Basic Law has been in practice for twenty years, yet critical aspects of 
Hong Kongs Constitution remain disappointingly primitive. In particular, the 
law regarding the interaction between Hong Kong and PRC legal systems, 
stemming from Article 158(3), is underdeveloped at best and misguided at worst. 
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A major impediment has been the Hong Kong judiciarys unwillingness to 
respect the role of the NPCSC under the Basic Laws constitutional order. 
Given the clear historical transplant of TFEU Article 267 into the Basic 
Laws Article 158(3), it is worth giving serious thought to how the E.U. 
experience with preliminary references can help develop Hong Kongs 
constitutional jurisprudence. The similarities between Article 267 and Article 
158(3) are not just superficial; they implicate the very forms and purposes of 
these constitutional provisions. Hong Kong should embrace the opportunity for 
direct comparison. 
Hong Kong courts can adopt all the rules of judicial economy, including 
the doctrines of irrelevant question, acte éclairé, and acte clair. Doing so would 
encourage a more inclusive view of what modern Hong Kong law isnot 
merely common law but a common law with aspects of Chinese law as well. 
Hong Kong should also recognize a fundamental principle of sincere 
cooperation. It would require an active judicial dialogue between the CFA and 
the NPCSC. It would require the CFA to refer questions of interpretation in 
good faith, and it would require the NPCSC to give reasoned, instructive 
interpretations. The constitutional design of the Basic Law expects nothing less 
than full cooperation and mutual respect. 
Developing the Basic Law was never going to be easy. But, as one 
respected Hong Kong constitutional scholar has said: 
[I]f one country, two systems is to work, it is necessary to develop a 
jurisprudence that is acceptable to both sides and one that reconciles the 
differences or at least provides principles and norms that define what 
differences are tolerable.116 
A return to Article 158(3)s E.U. roots would accomplish just that. It would 
convert the Basic Law into a constitutional system with productive judicial 
dialogue, clear precedents, coexistence of two systems in one country, and 
continued impact beyond 2047. 
                                                 
116  Albert Chen, Another Case of Conflict Between the Court of Final Appeal and the NPC Standing 
Committee?, 31 H.K.L.J. 179, 185 (2001). 
